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It  is  a  great  privilege  to  be  invited  to  give  the  First  Pakistan  Development 
Economists’  Society  Lecture  honoring  Professor  Gustav  Ranis  and  his  greatly 
acclaimed  and  wide  ranging  contributions  to  economic  development  theory  and 
practice, human development, and institution building at Yale,  at UNDP, Pakistan 
and elsewhere. Gus Ranis has been a towering figure in development economics,   a 
distinguished  Professor  of  Economics  at  Yale,   Director  of  Yale  centers  for 
Economic  Growth  Center  and  International  and  Area  studies,  an  Assistant 
Administrator of  US AID, and, last but not least, effectively the first Director of the 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. 
He has formally or informally guided PIDE’s work for decades, has been a good 
friend of Pakistan and has never lost interest in its development. 
Gus was a contemporary and a friend of Mahbub ul Haq in mid 1950s at Yale and 
their friendship further ripened when Mahbub asked him to join him and others including 
Amartya Sen in the first UNDP report on Human Development in 1990. My relationship 
with Gus Ranis also goes back nearly a century again because of my studies at Yale. He 
had, as a member of my PhD thesis approving committee, some reservations about my 
draft submitted in 1960 but was happy to see that his points had been fully taken into 
account in the published version in Yale Economic Essays a year later.   A dozen years 
later  I  found  myself,  as  the  lead  economist  of  World  Bank  on  the  Philippines,  the 
principal discussant of his Gus Ranis’  ILO mission report  on the Philippines. I must say 
that he accepted my criticisms of  some of his conclusions with good grace and humour. 
Our paths have crossed frequently since then most notably at the World Bank and PSDE 
meetings.  
My  lecture  today  deals  with  some  of  subjects  closest  to  Prof.  Ranis’  heart:  
progress in international development, impact of globalisation and lessons for Pakistan, 
the land of many missed economic opportunities.   
The subject of this conference is Economic Sustainability in a Globalised World. 
How does one define Economic Sustainability in what will hopefully remain a globalised 
world?  
Parvez Hasan <phasan@aol.com> is a former Chief Economist of the World Bank. He is also author of 
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More than half a century ago, W. W. Rostow
1 in formulating his theory of take-off 
into growth argued that if the rate of net capital formation and savings as a percentage of 
net national product (NNP) increases from about 5 percent to around 10-12.5 percent of 
NNP,  radical  changes  in  production  techniques  and  perpetuation  of  new  scale  of 
investment  would  assure  sustained  economic  growth  of  around  2  percent  per  capita 
assuming  population  is growing  at 1-1.5  percent per  annum.   Rostow,  however,  laid 
down two more conditions of takeoff, substantial growth in one or two in branches of 
manufacturing activity and ‘the  existence  or  quick emergence of a political, social and 
institutional  framework which exploits the  impulses of expansion in the modern sector 
and the potential external economy effects of the takeoff ’. 
About the same time, W. Arthur Lewis had defined the central problem in the 
theory of economic development was ‘to understand the process by which a community 
which was previously saving and investing 4 or 5 percent of its national income or less, 
converts itself into an economy where voluntary saving is running at 12-15 percent of 
National Income or more’.
2 
It may appear at first sight that the thresholds of savings and investments suggested by 
Rostow and Lewis have been long met. There are now hardly any developing countries with 
the ratio of gross capital formation to GDP of less than 15 percent.  Nevertheless, only a small 
number of developing countries have been able to attain steady and significant growth in per 
capita  income  over  long periods of  say  several decades.   There have been quite a few 
promising looking take- offs that ended in crash landings. 
A closer look suggests that the centrality of saving and investment remains an 
issue for a number of developing countries.  These days there is too much focus on rates 
of gross capital formation. Rostow’s concepts of net savings and investments are largely 
forgotten.   Using  the  concept  of  net  capital  formation,  i.e.,  after  allowance  for 
consumption of capital, the investment and savings ratios, while showing a wide variation 
appear less than robust for a significant number of major developing countries. 
According  to  recent  World  Bank  data,  in  most  developing  countries  annual 
consumption of fixed capital is in the range of 8–12 of gross national income (GNI).
3 Table 1 
presents the adjusted saving investment data. Net investment to GDP ratios are exceptionally 
high for only China and India 34.8 and 25 percent respectively, while they are below 12 
percent for half the countries including Pakistan (using more recent data). On the savings side 
the picture is a bit better though several large countries Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan (again using 
recent data), and Turkey  have net saving ratios of less than 10 percent  and three African 
countries, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Kenya have ratios of less than 5 percent.
4  
This suggests that for a number of countries saving and investment rates are much 
below what would be considered as minimum to ensure sustain growth especially as 
population growth at about 2.0 percent per annum in low income countries (excluding 
China) remains above the level assumed by him.  
1W. W. Rostow,  The  Take off into  Self  sustained Economic Growth, The Economic Journal, Volume 
66 March 1956, pp. 25-48. 
2W. Arthur Lewis Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour, Manchester School May 
1954. 
3World Bank, 2008 World Development Indicators, Table 3.16. 
4Very high rate of reported net savings for some countries notably Philippines, Nigeria,  Morocco, and 
Bangladesh may   partly reflect the considerable differences   between their GNI and GDP because of worker 





as a % 
GDP 
Capital       
Consumption 
Allowance 
as% of GNI 
Net Capital 
Formation 
as % of  GDP 
Net Saving 
as % of 
GNI 
Bangladesh  25.0  8.1  16.9  23.2 
Ethiopia  12.0  6.9  5.1  2.5 
India  34.0  9.0  25.0  24.7 
China  45.0  10.2  34.8  43.6 
Sri Lanka  29.0  9.7  19.3  15.1 
Vietnam  21.0  9.0  12.0  28.7 
Pakistan   22.0  8.4  13.6  14.7 
Indonesia  25.0  10.4  14.6  17.2 
Egypt  19.0  10.4  10.2  12.3 
Thailand  28.0  9.8  17.8  20.0 
Philippines  14.0  8.4  5.6  22.1 
Morocco  32.0  10.5  21.5  24.5 
Nigeria  22.0  10.2  11.8  28.5 
Colombia  24.0  11.4  10.6  9.5 
Turkey  24.0  11.7  12.3  4.9 
Korea  30.0  13.3  16.7  17.1 
Malaysia  21.0  12.1  8.9  20.6 
Mexico  22.0  12.4  9.6  9.8 
Brazil  17.0  12.0  5.0  5.8 
Chile  20.0  14.2  5.8  13.4 
Argentina  24.0  12.0  12.0  15.0 
Kenya  19.0  9.6  9.4  0.5 
Tanzania  19.0  7.8  11.2  3.6 
Algeria  30.0  11.8  18.2  NA 
USA  19.0  12.2  6.8  1.9 
Source: World Bank: 2008 Development Indicators.  
To add to the challenge, notions of what are considered as necessary rates of 
economic growth have changed over time.   The population explosion and the needs 
of adequate job creation have pushed the desired per capita annual growth levels to 
4-5 percent or higher. Indeed, in China, even though the labour force is now growing 
slowly,  it  is felt that per  capita GDP  growth  of  at least 7-8  percent per  annum is 
needed for many years to take care of the large overhang of underemployed labour in 
agriculture.   
So economic sustainability should obviously relate to some minimum desired rate 
of economic growth that would ensure adequate job creation and a steady reduction in 
poverty incidence in a particular country context.   However, it is doubtful that sustained 
growth rates of per capita income of less than 3-4 percent per annum would be adequate 
for most developing countries in the initial stages of development.  How does the record 
look in light of these admittedly somewhat arbitrary criteria? Parvez Hasan  406
ECONOMIC GROWTH RECORD 
The last half century has been a period of rapid growth in world economy and 
international trade. Export led growth, more market oriented policies, higher savings and 
investments, and much larger international private investment flows have all contributed 
to accelerated growth and, to an extent, shared prosperity.   Economic advancement in 
East  Asian  countries  and  more  recently  in  China  and  India  has  been  an  outstanding 
success story though the deepening international recession and economic setback may 
take some luster out of their performance. 
Despite considerable progress, development challenges remain huge. The latest 
Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) GDP per capita figures for 2007, based for the first time 
on  comprehensive surveys in  2005,   do not provide   a great   deal of comfort about 
international  development.  (Table  2)  India,  China,  Indonesia,  Brazil,  Pakistan, 
Bangladesh,  Nigeria,  Mexico,  Philippines,  Vietnam,  Ethiopia,  Egypt,  twelve  of  the 
largest developing countries by population have, as a group, income level only about 9 
percent of the per capita GDP of the United States in PPP terms, using US as a rough 
proxy for the developed world.  
Brazil  and  Mexico,  the  highest  income  of  these  developing  countries  had  per 
capita income respectively of 20.9 and 27.9 percent of the US level. (As a reference, 
South Korea was at 54.0 percent). On the poorest end, Bangladesh and Ethiopia had 
relative income levels respectively of 3.0 and 1.4 percent compared to the US. So the 
disparities among the developing countries are also huge.  
Table 2 
PPP based Per Capita GDP Most Populous Developing Countries Compared to US 
Country 
Population, 
2007              
In  Millions 
GDP Per    
Capita 
PPP $, 2007 
GDP Per   
Capita 
PPP $, 2007 
As % of US 
Economic Size 
GNI PPP   
Current      
International $ 
In Billion 
China  1320  5046  11.7  7083.5 
India  1123  2599  6.0  3078.7 
Indonesia  226  3519  8.1  807.9 
Brazil  192  9034  20.9  1759.7 
Pakistan  162  2383  5.5  417.5 
Bangladesh  159  1242  2.9  212.7 
Nigeria  148  1866  4.3  262.5 
Mexico  105  12 070  27.9  1324.6 
Philippines  88  3218  7.4  327.8 
Vietnam  85  2454  5.7  216.9 
Ethiopia  79  735  1.7  61.7 
Egypt  75  5052  11.7  407.6 
USA  302  43227  100  13829.0 
Source: World Bank Economic Data Division. State of International Development  407
China despite its immense progress during the last few decades had a per capita 
income of less than 12 percent of the US level in 2007 and among others only Egypt had 
an equivalent per capita. India, the second most populous country in world, had average 
income level only 6 percent that of US. Indonesia and Philippines were in between China 
and  India  while  Pakistan,  and  Vietnam,  were  closer  to  the  latter  with  Nigeria 
considerably behind. 
Clearly the gap between the rich and poor countries remains very large but is it 
narrowing?  Or more importantly, how many developing countries have met the test of at 
least 3-4 percent per capita growth over the last several decades. Admittedly, the levels of 
income are only one facet of progress. Other dimensions, human development, poverty 
incidence, income inequality, law and order, access to justice,  environmental change are 
also critically important and intertwined   with economic growth   and are being given 
much  more  attention  by  all  social  scientists,  policy  makers  and  the  international 
community than just a few decades ago. Still, adequate growth in average incomes in 
developing countries across the globe remains fundamentally important for world peace 
and prosperity. 
There are of course some problems with most measures of change in per capita 
incomes over time. 
The most frequently used tool for comparison is the rate of growth of per capita 
GDP based on national data. This has broad relevance but also some limitations. For 
instance, the GDP measure does not   capture major variations in the fortunes of countries 
caused by sharp secular changes in the terms of trade reflecting major shifts in relative 
prices of key internationally traded goods and services and does not take into account the 
impact of net service income or payments abroad and private transfers such as worker 
remittances. Also the growth rates of domestic output can be distorted if large parts of 
agriculture and/or industry are heavily protected and not internationally competitive. 
The World Bank GNI measure takes into account net income and transfers from 
abroad and terms of trade changes but does not provide a constant price series over time.  
Purchasing power parity estimates of GDP complemented by GNI measure can provide a 
better indication of relative shifts in incomes among countries. But consistent PPP based 
series based on regular relatively short interval are not available. Hopefully, the ICP project 
will intensify it updating work and conduct a fresh survey at least every five years. 
I have attempted in Table 3 to provide the average annual per capita GDP growth 
rates  over  1980–2007  for  a  couple  of  dozen  countries  (including  the  dozen  most 
populous) by using two different sets of data and method.  First sets of growth rates are 
those derived conventionally from the national accounts data.   The second estimates of 
growth rates are based World Bank Atlas method data on GNP/GNI in current US $ for 
1980 and 2007 adjusted for inflation in US dollars of 126.5 percent over 1980–2007 or 3 
percent per annum. The gains in per capita incomes for most countries by this method 
appear much smaller than those indicated by national account figures.  
On the GDP growth data, there is no surprise that only China, Korea, Thailand and 
Vietnam had very satisfactory per capita growth rates exceeding 4 percent per annum. 
India, Sri Lanka, Chile, Indonesia and Malaysia had also good annual growth rates of 
between 3-4 percent. But in the next rung Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, and Bangladesh   with 
growth  rates  between  2-3  percent  did  not  meet  what  I  would  consider  a  minimum 
sustainable threshold of 3 percent per annum. Parvez Hasan  408
China is clearly an outlier with an annual growth rate of per capita GDP of 8.5 per- 
cent over 1980-2007. But this growth rate appears to be exaggerated because the interpolation 
puts the Chinese GDP in 2005 constant prices at $525 in 1980 not only well below Pakistan 
($1191), India ($889), but considerably below Bangladesh ($614) and Ethiopia (608). This 
does not seem quite plausible.   The first World Bank economic mission to China, that   I 
headed in 1980, found that Chinese GDP at that time was only moderately lower than the 
Indian GNP according to World Bank Atlas methodology (see Table 3).  
Many large countries including Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Philippines, Mexico and 
Brazil and a few smaller ones Kenya, Tanzania, and Argentina show growth rate of less 
than 1 percent per annum.   
Using the World Bank Atlas data over time, the    implicit real growth rates 
appear  much more modest though the order ranking by countries does not change 
much. China and Korea retain their outlier status followed by Vietnam, Sri Lanka 
and Thailand. Among other countries only Turkey, Chile, Malaysia, India   matched 
or bettered the US the per capita growth rate of 1.7 percent per annum over 1980-
2007. Thus according to this method 15 countries including Pakistan out of 24 lost 
relative ground to the US.  
Table 3  
Countries 
Average  Annual 
Growth Rate of Per 
Capita GDP 
1980–2007 
Per Capita GNP/ 
GNI,   According to  
World Bank Atlas 
Method in Current 
US $ 
1980 
Per Capita GNP/ 
GNI,   According to  
World Bank Atlas 
Method in Current 
US $ 
2007 
Real Annual      
Average Growth 
Rates of Per Capita 
GNP/ GNI, as  
Adjusted by US 
GDP Average 
Deflator Growth of      
3 percent Per    
Annum 
Bangladesh  2.6  200  470  0.1 
Ethiopia  0.8  320 (1981)  220  –3.0 
India  4.0  270  950  1.7 
China  8.5  220  2360  6.1 
Sri Lanka  3.6  280  1540  3.4 
Vietnam  5.0 (1984-2007)  220 (1989)  790  4.2 
Pakistan   2.6  330  870  0.6 
Indonesia  3.5  500  1650  1.4 
Egypt  2.7  500  1580  1.2 
Thailand  4.6  720  3400  3.0 
Philippines  0.8  690  1620  0.1 
Morocco  1.8  970  2250  0.1 
Nigeria  0.3  780  930  –2.4 
Colombia  1.6  1190  3250  0.6 
Turkey  2.6  1920  8020  2.3 
Korea  5.9  1810  19690  6.4 
Malaysia  3.5  1830  6540  1.7 
Mexico  0.9  2520  8340  1.3 
Brazil  0.7  2190  5910  0.5 
Chile  3.6  2240  8350  1.9 
Argentina  0.8  2940  6050  –0.4 
Kenya  0.5  460  680  –1.6 
Tanzania  1.2  190 (1990)  400  1.4 
Algeria  0.8  2060  3620  –1.0 
USA  2.0  12980  46040  1.7 
Source: World Bank Data Division. State of International Development  409
The list of economic laggards and failures is both long and depressing whatever 
the criterion used. In Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Kenya, and apparently Algeria have been 
development disasters. In East Asia the Philippines has had a dismal  record and has 
steadily lost ground to all its neighbors. In South Asia, sustained significant long term 
growth in Pakistan and Bangladesh has yet to find traction. In Latin America, Argentina 
and surprisingly Brazil and Mexico have also not shown strong long term growth. 
This  impressionistic  survey  also  strongly  suggests  that  economic  fortunes  of 
countries  can  change  dramatically  up  and  down  in  a  single  generation  and,  in  my 
experience, that responsibility for change rests largely on the countries themselves. What 
explains the success stories? Or the equally important question what accounts for poor 
economic performance?  
SEARCHING FOR SUCCESS 
Economists,  policy-makers  and  international  finance  institutions  especially  the 
World  Bank  have  continued  to  struggle  with  defining  the  ingredients  of  success  or 
sources of failure for decades. On the whole, the development record is not too reassuring 
and  policy  prescriptions  have  not  generally  worked  well  in  countries  with  the  most 
difficult  challenges.  Obviously,  there  are  no  simple  answers,  no  single  formula  for 
success and many roads to failure.  
A recent volume by Shahid Yusuf,
5  that critically analyses the evolution of thinking 
on  development  economics  in  the  World  Bank  as  encapsulated  in  the  thirty  World 
Development Reports (WDRs) since 1978,  poses the questions “When the ‘technology of 
development’ is so widely shared—not the least through the WDRs—why are there so 
many laggards? Why aren’t the ranks of ‘tiger economies’ growing by the year? ”  
In the rest of paper, I examine some of these questions in light of both empirical 
evidence and my own development experience stretching over several decades and some 
twenty countries including Pakistan and many so-called East Asian tigers. I then focus on 
drawing some lessons that seem relevant for Pakistan and highlighting desired policy 
goals and imperatives that have so often eluded us in the past.                                                                  
EXPORT ORIENTED GROWTH 
The  starting  point  must  be  East  Asia,  where  manufactured  goods  export-led 
growth  by  the  pioneers  Hong  Kong,  Taiwan,  Korea  and  Singapore  in  the  1960s 
established new standards of rapid growth. These examples were quickly emulated by 
Thailand,  Malaysia,  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  in  the  1970s.  China  started  its 
spectacular push in exports in early 1980s. 
In the same way as South Korea’s development strategy drew its inspiration from 
examples  of  Japan,  Taiwan  and  Singapore,  China,  under  Deng  Xiaoping,  in  its  historic 
opening to the outside world starting as late as 1979, drew on the example of Hong Kong.  
Just a couple of decades ago, few could have imagined that a continental economy like China 
could make exports expansion its growth engine by turning large parts of its Eastern Coast 
into essentially free trade zones. In a generation, exports of goods and services from China  
5Shahid Yusuf, Development Economics Through the Decades, A Critical Look at   30 years of the 
World Bank, The World Bank, 2009, p. 90.   Parvez Hasan  410
had risen to well a trillion dollars by 2007   or well over 40 percent of GDP. China is now by 
far the most export oriented large country in the world. Exports to GDP ratio of 23 percent 
and 11 percent for India and USA respectively compare unfavourably with China.  
More recent success stories countries like Turkey and, Vietnam have also relied on 
exploiting  the  possibilities  offered  by  almost  explosive  growth  in  international  trade. 
Putting it another way, there are few cases of rapid economic advance in modern history 
that  have  not  relied  on  exports  as  an  engine  of  growth.  But  many  countries  notably 
Philippines and Mexico have not been able to translate high rates of growth of exports 
into sustainable high overall growth rates.  
There are also big differences between  China and  the earlier export successes of 
countries like Korea, and Taiwan. Large foreign investments did not play that much of a role 
in rapid development of   exports from East Asia as they have in China.  Then there is the case 
of Pakistan where earlier successes in exports in 1960s and1980s were not sustained:  its ratio 
of exports of goods and services to GDP actually declined to 17 percent in 2006.   
ROLE OF GLOBALISATION 
Many  East  Asian  countries  especially  China  deserves  credit  for  taking  full 
advantages of the forces unleashed by rapid globalisation.   But it also should be noted 
that  the  spectacular  growth  rates  of    these  countries  would  not  have  been  possible 
without major liberalisation of world economic order.  
The most important manifestation of phenomenon that is now called globalisation 
has been the expansion of world trade at a much faster pace than world output since the 
1960s. The rapid expansion of world trade has been accompanied by wider dissemination 
of technologies, a greater role of intermediate products (or components) in structure of 
trade  and  greater  role  for  multinational  corporations  in  greater  international 
specialisation. The sharply accelerated flows of private finance and greater reliance on 
foreign workers have further deepened globalisation trends at least until recently.  
International trade flows have been stimulated by the steady liberalisation of trade 
policies and reduction of tariffs as well as by technological changes reducing transport 
costs and improving information flows. The leading edge of this expansion has been the 
growth in world manufactured goods exports which have increased steadily from less 
than $ 200 billion in 1970 to $ 8.2 trillion in 2006, showing an average real growth of 11 
percent.  While  the  nature  of  international  trade  in  manufactures  has  changed  quite 
significantly from finished goods to intermediate products or components, there was no 
trend of   slowing down in the pace of this growth till 2007.  
Given the increasing liberal trade framework, the shifting comparative advantage 
especially  in  labour-intensive  manufactured  goods  has  also  meant  that  the  share  of 
developed countries (USA, Japan and EU15) in World manufactured exports has been 
declining. It came down from 75.8 percent in 1980 to 63.8 in 2000 and it is estimated to 
have dropped further to around 55 percent in 2006.   
Table  4  shows  that  for  the  sixteen  major  developing  countries/entities, 
manufactured exports rose   nearly 30 times in the last quarter century, from $ 94 billion 
in 1980 to $ 2.7 trillion. For the world as a whole they grew by less than eight fold from $ 
1.1 trillion to $ 8.3 trillion over the period. The average annual growth rate of developing 
countries’ manufactured exports has been around 14 percent.  State of International Development  411
Table 4 
Major Developing Countries’ Exports and   Trend in Their Market  































China   969.0  8.7  895.4  0.80  3.36  10.80 
Hong Kong  322.7  18.0  304.7  1.60  4.32  3.69 
Korea  325.7  15.7  290.1  1.43  3.08  3.50 
Singapore  271.8  8.3  214.1  0.76  2.66  2.59 
Taiwan  223.6  17.4  191.6  1.59  2.78  2.32 
Mexico  250.3  4.4  189.2  0.40  1.61  2.29 
Malaysia  160.6  2.4  117.9  0.22  1.48  1.42 
Thailand  130.6  1.6  98.4  0.15  1.11  1.19 
India  120.2  5.0  83.8  0.46  0.62  1.01 
Brazil  134.5  7.5  68.4  0.69  0.66  0.83 
Turkey   85.1  0.8  69.4  0.07  0.43  0.84 
Indonesia  104.0  0.5  44.4  0.05  0.62  0.54 
Philippines  47.0  2.1  40.6  0.19  0.37  0.49 
Vietnam  39.6  –  17.8  –  NA  0.24 
Pakistan  16.9  1.3  13.8  0.12  0.18  0.18 
Bangladesh  12.1  0.5  9.3  0.05  0.07  0.10 
Total for above 
Countries   3,216.0  94.1  2646.9  7.82  23.35  32.03 
World Exports  12,062.0  1,092.4  8256.8  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: WTO Statistical Tables.  
Note: Figures for Singapore, Bangladesh and Vietnam relate to 2005.  
The  most  important  development  was  a  hundredfold  growth  in  Chinese 
manufactured exports and a spectacular rise in its share in world manufactured goods 
market from a paltry 0.8 percent in 1980 to 10.8 percent in 2006.  
But many other Asian countries did well also. The high performers of the 1960s 
and 1970s in East Asia (Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong Taiwan),) further expanded their 
dominant export positions. Relative new comers to the field, Malaysia, Thailand, India, 
Vietnam and Philippines also did well.   Outside Asia only Mexico, Turkey, and Chile 
made notable gains.  
ROLE OF THE STATE 
Next to the favourable and improving international economic environment, the 
role of state in providing a vision and a strategy for development has often been critical.  
Apart from China, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia, and more recently India have all 
strongly benefited from positive directions provided by a reformed or reforming state. In 
Turkey  export  development  and  trade reform did  not become  a  priority  till  the  deep 
foreign exchange crisis of late 1970s led to many Turks being deprived of heat in a bitter 
winter and suffered acute shortages of their beloved coffee.          
In Korea, with which I was involved heavily over 1973-84, manufactured exports 
were  almost  negligible  in  early  1960s  and  saving  and  investment  and  balance  of 
payments gaps were huge. Park Chung He who assumed leadership in 1961, put his trust Parvez Hasan  412
in export development and export led growth became almost a religion in Korea during 
the 1960s and the 1970s. Exports trends were monitored monthly by a high level meeting 
chaired  by  the  President  and  attended  both  by  high  economic  officials  and  leading 
exporters with a view to coordinate policy and to do trouble shooting. As a result of this 
almost single minded focus, manufactured exports from Korea that were a modest $ 100 
million even by 1965 grew quickly to $ 600 million by 1970 and   were to exceed $10 
billion mark by 1980.
6  Merchandise exports from Korea in 2006 were $ 325 billion.  
The Korean export drive would not have been quite so successful if in early 1970s 
the Korean Planning Board had not, again under the direction of President Park, drawn up 
an ambitious plan to diversify and deepen the export and industrial structures. Till that 
time  the  Korean  exports  were  heavily  concentrated  in  labour-intensive  manufactured 
goods  such  as  textiles:  textiles,  clothing,  footwear  and  wigs  accounted  for  nearly  70 
percent of manufactured goods exports in 1970.  
Recognising that relatively low skill intensive manufactured exports will be losing their 
comparative advantage as real wages had  started  to rise sharply,  the political leadership 
launched a long term plan in 1973 to develop more skill and capital intensive heavy industries 
including steel and shipbuilding as well as electronics, the new growth pole in international 
trade. A part of this plan was to expand research and development activity. 
Apparently,  the  impulse  for  shipbuilding  came  directly  from  President  Park 
personally who wanted to emulate and ultimately challenge Japan’s dominant place in 
world shipbuilding at the time. He felt that Korea’s location, climate and educated and 
disciplined labour force could all eventually help match Japanese’s competitive edge. He 
had to actively encourage private entrepreneurs like Hyundai Group to take the risks in a 
field totally new to them. But he had the foresight not to create a monopoly by involving 
at three Chaebols in the field. Finally in launching the ship building industry as in many 
other areas of manufacturing including garments, textiles and electronics, Koreans did 
not  insist  on  strong  backward  linkages  right  away  and  were  content  initially  to  rely 
heavily on imported  managerial skills, technology and equipment. 
The  foray  into  shipbuilding  has  probably  exceeded  beyond  Korea’s  wildest 
expectations. In April 2006, Korean shipyards occupied the first seven of the ten top 
places in terms of order backlogs, the next two were Chinese and the tenth was the Japan 
industry leader Mitsubishi Heavy industries. 
It needs to be noted, however, that in some other areas of   heavy   and chemical 
industries, the state interventions did not succeed at least initially because of  excessive 
ambitious plans.  
In sharp contrast to East Asian countries, Pakistan’s export performance has been 
very disappointing.    Pakistan’s share in world manufactured exports at 0.18 percent is 
lower than it was in 1970. Pakistan has lost relative ground over time to all the major 
developing countries listed in the above Table 4 with the exception of Brazil.  
6Contrary to impressions, Korea’s rapid industrial growth was not generally associated with excessive 
protection of domestic industry or unduly large incentives for exports. While Korea relied heavily on a variety 
of export incentives till the early 1970s (nearly 32 percent in of export value in 1970), their main purpose was to 
compensate for the lags in the adjustment of the exchange rate and the high cost of   imported intermediate 
products. The real effective rate of subsidy on  exports of manufactured goods was in the range of 9-12 percent 
in  late  1960s—probably  a  peak.   See  Parvez  Hasan,  Korea,  Problems  and  Issues  in  a  Rapidly  Growing 
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WHY PAKISTAN FELL BEHIND? 
Why  has  Pakistan  fallen  so  far  behind  in  the  export  field?  There  are  several 
reasons  that  are  rooted  in  past  policies  and  attitudes  towards  exports.  First,  exports 
growth has never been a central pillar of development strategy a la Korea, Malaysia, and 
China. Second, exports were not as profitable as sales in the domestic markets which 
were heavily protected for a long period. The anti-export bias in policy was reinforced by 
an industrial strategy that favoured manufacturing based on processing of domestic raw 
materials.  Export  development  based  on  imported  inputs  was  strongly  discriminated 
against by generally high duties on imports. Finally, the spurts of export growth that 
materialised in 1960s and 1980s were to a substantially extent artificially supported by 
indirect subsidies to the textile sector that kept the domestic price of cotton well below 
the international price and thus encouraged relatively low value added textile exports 
notably cotton yarn.  
Pakistan  has  the  least  diversified  pattern  of  manufactured  exports  with  the 
exception  of  Bangladesh.  More  than  80  percent  of  Pakistan’s  manufactured  exports 
consist  of  textiles  and  clothing  compared  with  less  than  12  percent  for  developing 
countries as a group and 6.5 percent for world as a whole. While Pakistan is a major 
exporter of textiles and clothing, accounting for 2.1 percent of world exports, its exports 
of manufactured exports other than textiles and clothing are very small. At $2.7 billion in 
2006 they were only 0.033 percent of world manufactured goods exports totaling nearly 
$8  trillion.  India’s  manufactured  exports  (excluding  textiles  and  clothing)  are  nearly 
twenty five times that of Pakistan while countries like Philippines, Indonesia, Turkey—
by  no  means  stellar  performers  in  the  export  field—have  other  manufactured  goods 
export levels around 15 times that of Pakistan’s. Even a newcomer like Vietnam enjoys a 
5-fold advantage over Pakistan in this regard. Quite clearly public policies must share a 
significant  part  of  the  blame  for  the  present  structure  of  Pakistan’s  exports  with  its 
continued heavy dependence on textiles.   
GOOD GOVERNANCE AND EFFICIENCY IN USE OF RESOURCES 
Attention to manufactured exports and the state role in promoting exports cannot 
alone explain the East Asian Miracle. Many other factors like political stability, strong 
institutions, high levels of human capital, ability to handle negative economic shocks and 
economic crises effectively all contributed to the remarkable economic outcomes. They 
were ultimately reflected both in the level of mobilisation of resources for development 
and  the  efficiency  of  resources  use  as  measured  by  the  growth  in  total  factor 
productivity.
7  But  there  were  important  differences  among  countries  in  these  two 
respects.  
The high rates of   economic growth in Korea, as in Japan, Taiwan, and Hong Kong 
and  more  recently  in  China  and  unlike  Malaysia,  Indonesia,  and  Singapore  were  made 
possible by rapid growth in total factor productivity as well as sharp increases in inputs of 
capital and labour. According to a World Bank study, total factor productivity growth in 
Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong over 1960-1989 was around 3.5 percent per annum.
8   Over the  
7Export  development  also  improves  TFP  by  inducing  technical  change  and  shifting  the  economic 
structure towards more higher economic  value added activities.   
8World Bank 1993. Parvez Hasan  414
same period, the factor productivity growth for most developing economies (excluding high 
performing East Asian countries)  was negative or less than 1 percent per annum.   
The recent estimates for China indicate that factor productivity rose steadily in 
both  agriculture  and  non-agriculture  sectors  from  1.5  and  1  percent  per  annum 
respectively to over 3 percent by 2004.
9   But as noted earlier, if the Chinese growth rates 
are  somewhat  exaggerated,  the  factor  productivity  estimates  would  also  need  to  be 
revised downwards. 
In  terms  of  productivity,  the  contrast  between  the  Philippines  and  Korea  is 
instructive because it confirms that export growth alone cannot turn the economy around. 
The growth rate of exports from the Philippines has been consistently high and share of 
exports of goods and services in the economy has increased further from 36 percent in 
1990 to 46 percent in 2006 propelled by strong growth of manufactured goods (Table 4) 
as well as worker remittances. Still Philippines remains an important economic laggard in 
Asia. 
Total factor productivity data for the Philippines is not readily available. However, 
its incremental capital: output ratios   (ICORS)   remained persistent high around 4.5: 1 
during 1960-2000 and were at least 50  percent higher than that in Korea in the 1970s, 
even though industrial deepening and capital intensive investments had already taken off 
in Korea by then. At one time, I estimated that if the Philippines had the same capital; 
output ratio in the 1960s and the 1970 as Korea had, its growth rate would have been at 
least 50 percent higher than it actually was. 
The broad efficiency of resource use was particularly important in Korea in the 
early stages of its development because initially the weight of exports in the economy 
was small. The ratio of manufactured exports to gross manufacturing output was only 5 
percent in 1960. Even after very rapid growth in manufactured exports during this was 
only 15 percent in 1970.
10 It reached the peak of 40-45 percent share in the 1990s and 
now stands at around 40 percent.   
The  contribution  that  very  proficient  and  modern  construction  industry,  which 
largely developed through the large scale infrastructure spending after the end of the 
Korean War in early 1950s, made to keeping capital costs low is less well known. In 
general also good organisation and greater internal management and labour discipline 
meant  that  projects  could  be  completed  more  speedily  than  in  most  other  countries. 
Finally, low capital: output ratios in Korea provide indirect evidence that corruption was 
low and leakages and underhand payments that ultimately increase project costs were not 
very significant. In the Philippines, in sharp contrast, high levels of corruption led to 
artificially inflated costs of projects that were ultimately reflected in the high ICORs.   
SHIFTING PARADIGMS: MARKETS, GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONS 
 While most East Asian countries were flourishing, for many developing countries, 
‘‘the 1970s were a    decade of creeping disillusionment—not development…….and the 
1980s  turned  out  to  be  harsher”
11  in  part  due  to  the  two  oil  shocks  that  greatly  
9Loren  Brandt  and  others,  “Growth  and  Structural  Transformation  in  China’’  in  China’s  Great 
Transformation Editors Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, Cambridge University Press 2008. 
10Parvez Hasan and D.C. Rao,  Korea Policy Issues for the Long Run, World Bank 1979. 
11Shahid Yusuf (2008), pp. 23–24. State of International Development  415
exacerbated the foreign exchange problems  of oil importing countries. The faith in state 
solutions  waned  and  belief  in  market  forces  and  competitive  pressures  gathered 
momentum. Under Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, two of the most influential 
politicians  of  the  1980s,  a  diminution  of  the  regulatory  state  and  with  the  partial 
dismantling of public sector through privatisation became the conventional wisdom. But 
as Ravi Kanbur notes the mainstream economics went “from a situation where state could 
do no wrong to one where the state could no right…..The pendulum swung too far the 
other way. That it  began to swing the other way was due to experience. That it swung too 
far the other way was due to ideology”.
12 
Economic thinking has continued to evolve. As getting prices right and increasing 
openness of the economies did not appear to solve development problems, the emphasis 
has shifted to the role of institutions in providing effective regulation through ensuring 
transparency and accountability, removing information gaps, removing barriers to entry  
and  enforcement  of  property  rights,  contracts  and  of  the  rules  that  affect  market 
functioning. 
So under the rubric of what is loosely termed as good governance the state was 
back even before the current international crisis. It must provide strategic directions to the 
economy including exploiting of opportunities offered by globalisation as well as safe-
guarding against its excesses. It must ensure effective delivery of basic public services 
such as law and order, justice, education and health, infrastructure. And of course it must 
ensure proper functioning of the market economy.     
But  in  order  to  achieve  good  governance,  a  country  has  to  have  reasonable 
political  stability,  a  political  leadership  and  elites  who  respect  the  rule  of  law,  a  
bureaucracy and public bodies that are honest and efficient, political will to mobilise 
enough resources for running  an  effective government,  and a   right balance between 
national  security  and  development  needs.  Pakistan  has  not  performed  well  on  these 
governance  criteria  and  therefore  it  has  not  been  able  to  match  the  record  of  high 
performing  Asian  economies  despite  its  considerable  potential  and  large  inflow  of 
resources from abroad. 
Broadly speaking also it is poor governance that is mainly responsible for the 
plight  of  poor  performing  countries  especially  in  Africa.  Again  in  my  experience, 
successful  countries  in  East  had  reasonably  strong  bureaucracies  with  good  internal 
discipline and coordination. Korea was outstanding but Malaysia also had a well paid and 
high caliber civil service. Pakistan started with a very strong administrative base but one 
that has declined both in standards of efficiency and integrity. But as the Philippines’ 
case shows cultural factors do also influence public sector performance. Unfortunately 
good governance cannot be ordained and thus the economists are discovery the limits of 
technology of development. 
But one should hasten to add that good governance alone is not the panacea and 
even with uneven governance, there may be ways to improve economic management and 
performance. Till 1980s China and India had reasonably good governance but not a very 
successful economic growth record. Pakistan has enjoyed periods of high growth with 
good economic management though governance remained a  serious problem.   
12Ravi  Kanbur, The  Development  of Development  Thinking, Cornell  University, Ithaca  New  York 
2005p.13 as quoted in Shahid Yusuf (2008).  Parvez Hasan  416
So  even  with  uneven  governance,  there  are  ways  to  improve  economic 
management  and  Pakistan  can  learn  important  lessons  about  development  from  the 
success stories in East Asia.   But because developments in the international economic 
system have been a key part of economic success stories, the first question is whether 
globalisation will unravel under the pressure of prolonged global recession.  
WILL GLOBALISATION SURVIVE? 
International trade is expected to decline in absolute terms for the first time in half 
a  century  and  private  capital  flows  have  already  dropped  precipitously.  Protectionist 
pressures seem to be growing in many countries and protectionism has the danger of 
spreading  to  financial  services.  The  next  few  years  are  likely  to  bring  about  major 
changes in which the globalised financial system is managed and regulated. The role of 
the  IMF  is  very  definitely  likely  to  expand  in  managing  major  global  imbalances—
ironically just a couple of years after a major downsizing of its staff due to budgetary 
concerns. These changes will put limits on leveraging by major financial institutions, a 
rethinking in developing countries about totally free capital markets, and more attention 
to longer-term structural issues in international finance especially the huge and sustained 
deficits  in  the  US  current  account  balance  of  payments  that  have  proven  to  be  the 
Achilles’ heel of the globalised economic system. 
It is my belief, however, that while major changes in the international financial 
system,  introduction  of  appropriate  regulation  and  safeguards,  and  much  greater 
international  cooperation  on  financial  issues  are  necessary  and  would  take  place,  the 
world trading system will emerge relatively unscathed from the present crises. Exports as 
an engine of world growth will survive because of the considerable gains that continuing 
international division of labour based on ever evolving comparative advantage promises. 
The countries like China and Korea that export for 40-45 percent of their gross 
manufacturing output would undoubtedly face hardship. But China has substantial room 
for adjustment, its private consumption expenditure is only one third of its output and its 
current account balance of surpluses exceeded 10 percent of GDP.   Increased domestic 
consumption can provide an important cushion to reduced exports at least in the short run 
and China’s current account balance of payments needs to be reduced in any case as a 
part of rectifying global imbalances.  
PAKISTAN HAS NO CHOICE EXCEPT TO INCREASE  
EXPORT ORIENTATION 
Pakistan’s exports may also suffer in the short run: textile and clothing production, 
a significant part of which is exported will thus face further pressure. But despite difficult 
international outlook, it has no real alternative to rapid export development if it wishes to 
create adequate employment, raise wages, improve technological capability, and   meet  
rising obligations of debt servicing and investment income payments.  
Undoubtedly  Pakistan’s  export  push  will  not  be  easy.   Having  missed  several 
rounds of opportunities in international trade, it now faces stiff competition not only from 
China, which   has expanded its market share inexorably in recent years, but also from 
relative new comers, India, Turkey, Mexico, Vietnam. 
But  there  are  some  positives.  Some  of  more  established  East  Asian 
countries/entities, Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand and Korea, are 
finding it harder to increase their market share because of rising labour costs (see Table State of International Development  417
4)  and  are  shifting  to  more  skill  and  technology  intensive  products.  For  instance,  in 
textiles and clothing, exports from Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and even Malaysia are 
growing little and they are losing market share.   
In the longer run, say over 10 to 15 years China may face a similar situation if its 
record speed of economic growth continues. China’s labour surplus will not last forever 
though right now this prospect may be difficult to visualise. Also, as mentioned above, 
China’s  large  current  account  balance  of  payments  surpluses,  a  reflection  of  global 
imbalances, cannot continue indefinitely. The pressures of domestic consumption along 
with policy shifts such as exchange rate appreciation will, on the one hand, slow down 
export  growth  from  China  and  on  the  other  hand  increase  imports  into  China.  The 
opportunities for poor and populous Asian countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, 
would remain substantial. 
Increased trade with neighbours especially India holds considerable promise and 
should be seriously pursued. 
It must also be stressed that Pakistan’s very low share in manufactured exports 
other than textiles and clothing should be viewed as a source of major opportunities. 
Similarly  the  rise  in  world  grain  prices  can  give  new  lease  of  life  to  Pakistan’s 
agriculture. Finally, even in textiles and clothing which are the most problematic areas at 
present, the low level of productivity and low levels of valued added provides a great 
scope for improving competitiveness and raising export earnings.   Foreign investment 
from countries or entities, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong who are facing limits in their own 
textile industries could be a source of capital, know-how and market access.  
But the vision for rapid export development must give a central place to the very 
speedy growth of manufactured goods other than textiles and clothing for which our 
presence in world markets is trifling and exploiting the untapped potential of agricultural, 
horticultural, dairy and fisheries exports. A major transformation of the economy towards 
exports orientation on the scale that is being suggested here would involve a major role of 
the state not only in providing the overall vision but also in supporting, guiding and 
facilitating the progress especially in areas outside textiles and clothing.   
RAISING SAVING AND INVESTMENT LEVELS 
Pakistan’s gross investment rate was 20 percent of GDP in 2007-08 and is likely to 
drop  this  year.  National  savings  last  year  dropped  to  12  percent  of  GDP  as  current 
account balance of payments deficit rose to a record level. Net savings reached a nadir of 
probably  4-5  percent  of  GDP.  Public  savings  have  once  again  become  significantly 
negative (3 percent of GDP) as revenue growth has not kept pace with growing current 
expenditure especially security spending and interest payments. Political uncertainty has 
dampened both investment and savings and have encouraged capital flight.  Reversal of 
these trends is essential; in the medium term aim should be to raise gross national savings 
to at least 20 percent of GDP and investment rate to at least 25 percent of GDP. 
This would require an entirely different level of political commitment, a whole set 
of  new  policies  to  encourage  savings,  promoting  investment  and  discouraging 
conspicuous and wasteful consumption.  Fiscal policies have a central role in eliminating 
negative  government  savings  by  mobilising  resources  and  ensuring  a  better  balance 
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development outlays.   At the same time, tax and expenditure need to give much more 
attention to equity issues, the persistent neglect of which in the past has hurt both growth 
and  poverty alleviation efforts. 
One of the biggest problems remains the low level of tax revenue...The Federal tax 
revenue is unlikely to show much improvement in the current year over 2007-08 in terms 
of  the  ratio  to  GDP  (9.6  percent)  because  of  sluggish  economy  and  civilian  unrest. 
Meanwhile, the interest and defense burden have risen and according to latest State Bank 
quarterly report are approaching 75 percent of government revenue—a situation similar 
to the one at the end of the 1990s. 
Capital  flight  needs  to  be  reversed  through  improvement  in  security  position, 
realistic exchange rate policies and gradually building of international reserves to at least 
four months’ foreign exchange payments.   
IMPORTANCE OF IMPROVING FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY 
Even with heroic efforts Pakistan would not come close to levels of saving and 
investment already achieved by China and India. It  must therefore give special attention 
to improving factor productivity which is not only low but has  on average grown  slowly 
over the last  forty five years:  According to World Bank estimates, growth in total factor 
productivity (TFP) in Pakistan  increased 1.2 percent per annum.
13 
“Two factors may explain the disappointing growth in productivity. First, after 
important gains made in agricultural crop productivity following the green revolution and 
the breakthrough in cotton in the 1980s, crop productivity growth was actually negative 
over 1990-2003 at least in Punjab for which data are available….. Severe drought in 
several years and long-term deterioration in the quality of water and soils are part of the 
explanation but reduced effectiveness of agricultural research and extension services also 
played a role” …Second, the industrial and export sectors of Pakistan have not diversified 
and  not  increased  productivity  by  taking  advantage  of  the  tremendous  opportunities 
opened up by the growth in international trade, new products and new technologies.’’  
“But because it has fallen so far behind in world exports and apparently in levels 
of  productivity  in  agriculture,  industry  and  services,  there  are  major  possibilities  for 
playing catch up provided strategic directions can be set right and policy actions and 
investments support the new priorities. Again the two areas which hold special promise 
for accelerated growth in TFP as well as total output are agriculture and exports”.
14  
STATE AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
One of the most important lessons from development experience is the need for a 
harmonious relationship between the public and private sector built on national interest, 
mutual trust and respect, and pragmatic needs of the moment. Ideological purity can be 
harmful. 
In  retrospect,  the  young  economic  leaders  in  Russia  in  the  early  1990s  under 
Gaider made mistakes in hasty privatisation and blind faith in markets. They created 
monopolies and oligarchs and contributed to extreme social hardship with an inevitable 
backlash that has resulted in the State under Putin reasserting itself.  In both Russia and  
13Institute of Public Policy (IPP), Beaconhouse National University, Lahore Annual Report 2008.  
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Eastern  Europe  sufficient  attention  was  not  given  to  restructuring  and  rehabilitating 
salvageable  state  owned  enterprises  before  deciding  their  future.  This  was  in  sharp 
contrast to  Japan where after World War II  the state played  a major role in  picking 
industries and firms i.e. winners in the private sector that deserved large state support and 
were considered worth reviving after the  havoc caused by the war. 
Korea deserves high marks for ensuring competition among major private sector 
players  and  at  the  same  time  maintaining  open  communication  channels  between 
business and government in its drive towards industrialisation especially heavy industry.   
In Pakistan the relationship between the state and the private sector has long been 
ambivalent and marked by fair large swings in policy. On the one hand, large parts of the 
powerful bureaucracy have never really respected business and on the other hand large  
private sector firms in its relationship to government has often sought to maintain  their 
rent-seeking positions or subsidies when losses appear. In the process resource allocation 
has been distorted and medium and small industries have suffered.  
Much of this has changed in the last decade or so. Pakistan has a more liberal 
framework than a decade or so ago and institutions of restraint such as Securities and 
Exchange  Commission  and  the  competition  Authority  are  becoming  gradually  more 
powerful. 
Meanwhile, private sector has become much more important. The share of private 
investment which exceeded 50 percent of the total first time in the 1990s is now around 
75 percent. Public investment has been increasingly concentrated in infrastructure areas 
which do not pose direction competition to the private sector, indeed facilitate private 
sector development. So not only has the share of private sector in investment increased 
but there are growing complementarities between private and public investment. 
But key problems remain. 
First, in the power sector, which is largely in public hands, inefficiencies and lack 
of investment are causing frequent breakdowns and unprecedented load shedding The 
costs both in terms of industrial output lost and increase in costs for the private sector by 
requiring alternative generating capacity have been huge.  At the same time, large losses 
of public entities have become a significant drain on public resources.  It is not clear that 
large scale privatisation of WAPDA’s energy corporations is a quick and fully feasible 
answer at least in the short run.   
Secondly, though much progress has been made the private sector still looks too 
much to the government for solving its competitiveness problems by seeking tax, credit 
and other concessions. Rent-seeking behaviour has not entirely disappeared and genuine 
entrepreneurship is still hampered though medium and small industries are faring better 
than before. 
Third,  while  the  large  foreign  investment  flows  are  providing  a  more  balanced 
source of external finance, the bulk of foreign investments are taking place in areas like 
energy, telecom, financial and other services which do not contribute directly to export 
development.  
Further privatisation of public assets appears necessary because of the need for 
inducting additional capital, infusion of technology, and generally accelerating the pace 
of productivity improvements. The criteria and the process, however, need to be fully 
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The main point is that constructive and mutually supportive inter-face of state and 
private  sectors  remains  a  critical  ingredient  of  economic  success.  Policies  should  be 
driven mainly by pragmatic considerations and not by emotive responses and ideological 
hang ups.       
IMPROVING PUBLIC POLICIES: FORMULATION, IMPLEMENTATION, 
MONITORING AND COORDINATION 
Pakistan has had in history some major economic policy failures, lack of sufficient 
attention to exports, shifting attitudes to private sector, totally inadequate investments in 
human  capital,  neglect  of  population  control,  and  last  but  not  least  a  persistent  and 
excessive reliance on external resources for its development. But if one looks at country’s 
past plans and policies, the rhetoric was often right in terms of goals for higher savings 
rates, higher level of educational attainments, reduced dependence on external assistance 
etc.  Big  problems  have  been  the  lack  of  effective  implementation,  follow  up  and 
monitoring—simply  learning  what  is  going  on  and  what  is  working—and  adjusting 
policies accordingly and consequently not learning from own and others’ experience. 
This is where the contrast with countries like Korea is most striking. 
Will implementation be more successful than in the past? Apart from development 
of effective forums for dialogue and consensus building with the private sector discussed 
above, two areas desperately require urgent attention:   
 
Reinvigorating planning processes to monitor progress and deal effectively with 
economic crises and handling economic shocks. 
 
Close  coordination  of  economic  policies  across  ministries,  agencies,  and  
provincial  governments and clear delineation of responsibility for top economic 
leadership. 
Four or Five year plans have rightly gone out of fashion  but need for medium and 
long term planning processes  remains. 1960s were hey days of planning in Pakistan and 
its  development  efforts  were  hailed  as  a  rare  success  story.   However,  it  was  not 
necessarily the quality of the Second and Third Plans that made planning effective.
15  
 “What sets the 1960s apart from the other periods in Pakistan’s economic history 
is the central role given to the planning process as a tool of economic policy-making and 
coordination. The policy parameters were continuously shifting, as they often do, but it 
was  the  responsibility  of  the  Planning  Commission  to  try  to  maintain  a  coherent 
development perspective in a longer term context and attempt to resolve conflicts among 
policy objectives”.
16 
The preparation of Medium Term Economic Framework and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers, at both the Federal level and the Provincial level provide an important 
potential opportunity for invigorating planning. But the conceptual basis of work remains  
15Parvez Hasan (1998), p.153. In the case of the Second Plan, larger foreign aid availability under the 
Indus  Basin  Treaty  and  US  PL  480  made  possible  a  more  than  40  percent  expansion  in  public  sector 
development spending over original levels. In the case of the Third Plan, the opposite happened. The reduced 
foreign aid availability and increased allocation to defence led to a sharp reduction in the effective size of the 
planned public sector development outlays. 
16Parvez Hasan, p. 152. State of International Development  421
weak,  professional  capacity  has  been  diluted,  links  between  real  economy  and  key 
economic targets are often very loose, and there is insufficient attention to sector plans 
and the mix between policy requirements and investment needs. 
Planning processes are useless if they do not lead to effective and speedy policy 
responses  to  changing  circumstances.  This  cannot  happen  if  internal  mechanisms  for 
policy coordination do not exist or not working well as is in the case of Pakistan.   
There  are  no  cases  of  development  where  economic  progress  has  proceeded 
smoothly.  Economic crises occur regularly either because of overheating of the economy 
or large external shocks like the energy price increases. Successfully countries are able to 
quickly  recognise  changed  economic  circumstances  and  show  flexibility  but  poor 
performing countries postpone adjustment often at a great ultimate cost. An excuse for 
delay is the hope that a negative external shock will not last though there is a tendency to 
treat a positive external shock like an improvement in the terms of trade as permanent. 
The lesson of history is that a crisis should not be allowed to go to waste and 
should be considered as an opportunity to tackle deep seated problems.  Better planning 
processes and close economic coordination cannot substitute for economic will but can 
certainly improve the chances of rational decision-making.  
TURNAROUND IN PAKISTAN? 
There are no signs yet that Pakistan government is tackling its multi-faced crises 
with  a  broad  national  determination  to  deal  with  fundamental  problems  of  poor 
governance, lack of resources mobilisation for the public sector, and low taxation on the 
rich and the well to do to create more room for programmes for the poor. 
Instead  it  is  looking  once  gain  to  large  scale  external  assistance  to  maintain 
unsustainable levels of consumption. There is no announced external finance policy. It 
would help if  the government adopts a clear goal that current account balance payments 
deficits will not be allowed over the medium term to exceed 20 percent of investment. 
This will ensure that 80 percent of investment is financed from domestic resources and 
that unlike the past large external flows, either private or official, will not be a substitute 
for domestic savings.    